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AEW ERA OF
LAVISH LAND
GRANTS
By Danaya C. Wright

O

decision in Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v.
its
issued
Court
10, 2014,
United
n MarchStates,
134 S.the
Ct.Supreme
1257 (2014)
(No.
12-1173),

handing the government a stunning 8 to 1 defeat on
an issue of statutory construction of an 1875 act that
granted rights-of-way over public lands to railroads.
The Court held that the government retained no reversionary property interest in these federally granted
rights-of-way (FGROWs) once it patented the adjoining
property to settlers and therefore could not repurpose
those lands for rail corridor preservation or interim recreational trail use. Without even acknowledging the
potential takings liability that the government may
have to pay when it seeks to preserve these lands, once
granted for public transportation purposes and now
reused for a different public transportation purpose, the
decision provides a windfall to today's landowners: it
either gives them land they never bought, expected, or
received a deed for, or compensation for not receiving
land they never bought, expected, or received a deed for.
The Court in Brandt Revocable Trust was faced with a
circuit split. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had held that railroads received only easements
in these 1875 act FGROWs, and if the government did
not reserve its servient fee interest when it patented the
adjoining land, then it could not retake possession on
railroad abandonment and convert the corridor into
a recreational trail, despite federal statutes authorizing it to do so. Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308 (Fed.
Cir. 2005). The Tenth Circuit, however, had ruled that
the government retained a reversionary interest in all
Danaya C.Wright isthe Clarence J.TeSelle Professor of Law at
the University of Florida Levin College of Law in Gainesville,
Florida.
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FGROWs, regardless of whether they were fee interests or
easements in the railroads, and therefore it could repurpose
the land for continuing public uses. United States v. Brandt
Trust, 496 Fed. Appx. 822 (10th Cir. 2012).
Although the government prevailed in the Tenth Circuit,
it supported the petition for certiorari in the hopes that the
Supreme Court would overrule what the lower courts had
called the "wrongly decided" and "poorly reasoned" opinion in Hash. It was a dangerous strategy, especially because
the issues are complex, the history is dense, and the Court's
renewed fondness for the Takings Clause suggested it
would not blink at opening the federal treasury to hundreds of millions of dollars in potential takings liability.
At the end of the day, however, the decision did not rely on
the law, the history, or the policy of preserving public lands;
it relied instead on the supposed audacity of the government
to change its mind. As Justice Roberts said: "The Government
loses that argument today, in large part because it won when it
argued the opposite before this Court more than 70 years ago,

in the case of Great Northern Railway Co. v. United States." Brandt
Revocable Trust, 134 S. Ct. at 1264. Under such narrow punitive
thinking, we would still be living under the laws of Plessy v.

Ferguson,Bowers v. Hardwick,or Lochner v. New York. In this case,
however, it wasn't the government that got it wrong; it was the
Court.
This article summarizes the historical context for the
decision, including public policy considerations over time,
and provides critical analysis of the Brandt Revocable Trust
opinion. An expanded version of this article, including full
citations, appears in the Lexis/Nexis, Expert Commentary

Series on Hash v. United States and BrandtRevocable Trust v.
United States. For a fuller discussion of all of these matters,

see Danaya C. Wright, Rails to Trails: Conversion of Railroad
Corridorsto Recreational Trails, Powell on Real Property ch.
78A (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2009).

A Little Railroad History
From the earliest years of railroad
development in the 1830s, Congress
authorized the conveyance to any
charter railroad company of a "rightof-way" across the public lands for
the construction of a railroad (federally granted right-of-way, or
FGROW). In 1852, Congress passed
a general right-of-way act that gave
to the railroads a 100 foot right-ofway. Then, between 1862 and 1871,
through individual acts, Congress
gave railroads not only a 100 foot or
200 foot right-of-way but also the fee
ownership in alternating sections for

10 or 20 miles on each side of their
roadbed for sale to raise construction
funds. Then in 1875, discontinuing the checkerboard grants-in-aid,
Congress passed another general
right-of-way act to give a 200 foot
right-of-way to railroads across all
public lands.
Once a FGROW grant was made,
the remaining adjacent lands available for settlement in the vicinity of
the grant would be worth far more
than lands further out. But to prevent
conflicts between railroads and settlers, who would rush to claim lands
in an area through which a railroad

would be constructed, the land office
would temporarily withdraw all the
lands in the vicinity of the railroad
grant to give the railroad time to map
its corridor and lay claim to the public lands it required. Once the map
was filed, the adjacent land was made
available for settlement and patents
were given, subject to the priority of
the railroad's rights. Because surveying was still rough and the terrain
was unimproved, it was easier to
make the patents subject to the railroad corridor rather than providing
explicit metes and bounds descriptions describing the exact dimensions
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of the railroad land that was being
excluded.
The withdrawal policy made sense
if the railroad was relatively quick in
mapping its route and constructing
its road. But in the case of the transcontinental railroads in the 1862-71
period, which received large checkerboard grants of land with the right
to take alternate sections further out

THROUGHOUT THE
19TH AND 20TH
CENTURIES, THE
FEDERAL COURTS
WERE ADAMANT
THAT WITHDRAWN
LANDS WERE NOT
CONSIDERED PUBLIC
LANDS AVAILABLE
FOR PATENTING TO
HOMESTEADERS.

if the adjacent sections had already
been patented, the amount of land
withdrawn could stretch as wide as
a hundred miles and run halfway
across the continent. This withdrawal
policy frustrated settlers and land
speculators and fueled opposition
to the railroad grants, particularly
the checkerboard grants-in-aid. But
the cessation of checkerboard grants
did not alter the withdrawal policy
after passage of the 1875 act which
granted only rights-of-way. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the
federal courts were adamant that
withdrawn lands were not considered
public lands available for patenting to
homesteaders.
All of these federal grants used
the same term, a right-of-way, to
describe the land given to the railroads for construction of their roads,
and no limitations were placed on
the grants of the property other than
that the railroad be built within a
specified period of time. Moreover,

32
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the congressional history of these
land grants makes it clear that Congress intended that all the FGROWs,
regardless of the period of the grant,
be treated the same. As public sentiment turned against the checkerboard
grants-in-aid, Congress debated
whether the 1875 act rights-of-way
would be different from the earlier
rights-of-way.
During floor debate on the bill,
Congressman Hoar acknowledged
prior court decisions construing
FGROWs to reserve a property interest in the United States that could
defeat state law even if the United
States later parted with all its public lands in the vicinity. If the United
States had patented all the adjoining
land to settlers, and the railroad forfeited its right-of-way, Hoar thought
the corridor should pass to the state
or be governed by state law and not
remain within the dominion of the
federal government. Giving control
to the states also would be a change
from the way the earlier rights-ofway had been granted. He explained:
[W]hat would be the condition
of the road-bed? It is a tract of
land owned by the United States,
over which a railroad under
the authority of the United
States passes. Now, if the State
undertakes to meddle with that
location, it is meddling with
lands within its limit the property of the United States, and
with a right of way within its
limits granted by the United
States. The United States may
in the course of years or generations have parted with all
its public lands in the State or
in the vicinity of the road, and
still, whenever the State undertakes to exercise the ordinary
local authority of permitting a
highway across the track of the
road, or a bridge to be built over
it, . . . or another of those acts
which State authorities exercise,

the railroadwill meet the State with
the constitutionalobjection that
this land you are dealing with is the
property of the United States; the
eminent domain did not come
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from your State to us as in ordinary cases, and the right of way
with which we are clothed was
given by the United States. In
that case the people of the State
would either have to come to
Congress for a remedy or be
without it.
Congressman Townsend, the floor
manager for the bill, responded:
Is not that the condition in
which the Union Pacific Railroad stands in Kansas and has
stood, and in California too?
Congressman Hoar replied:
Undoubtedly; and I desire to
say, as my friend puts the question, that I regard as a most
lamentable fact in our history
the carelessness with which
between 1863 and 1865, or 1870,
Congress dealt with the great
function of incorporating these
great highways.... I think one
of the most distressing facts in
our history is the example of
carelessness and fraud which
was set in the organization of
these roads.
Cong. Rec. 2217-18 (Mar. 3, 1875)
(emphasis added).
Hoar then offered an amendment,
accepted by the House, that future
rights-of-way would be treated as
though the grants had come from the
states, not the federal government.
Had Congressman Hoar's amendment gone into law, it would have
made the 1875 act FGROWs different
from the earlier FGROWs. The Conference Committee report, however,
deleted the amendment, the House
accepted the conference report, and
the original bill was signed into law
the next day. Notably, under Congressman Hoar's amendment, and
the understanding of Congress in
1875 when it rejected the amendment and passed the act, there was
a retained interest in these FGROWs
that would permit subsequent state
or federal control on termination of
the railroad's interest.

Nearly 140 years later, the situation

presented in Brandt Revocable Trust is

Court modified its fee simple absolute interpretation, in Northern Pacific

precisely the situation anticipated by
Congressman Hoar, which is what
would happen after the FGROW was
granted to a railroad, the adjacent
land was patented to private settlers
subject to the railroad's right-of-way,
and then the railroad's interests were
forfeited or otherwise terminated.
Would the land return to federal
control based on some reversionary
interest retained by the federal government, or would possession of the
land pass to the adjacent landowner
whose patent granted the entire section of land but was made subject to
the railroad's right-of-way? Congressmen Hoar and Townsend believed
the land returned to federal control.
The federal courts, however, had a
different response, viewing the outcome as dependent on the nature
of the property rights the railroad
received in these different FGROW
grants.

Railway Co. v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267

A Little Railroad Law

Bybee v. Oregon & C. Ry. Co., 26 F.586,

In 1880, the Supreme Court held that
an 1862-71 FGROW conveyed to the
railroad a fee simple absolute interest.

588 (C.C. D. Or. 1886).
The limited fee concept made a lot
of sense. Because the grant was initially from the government, only the
government would be able to exercise
its power of termination and declare
a forfeiture or
an abandonment. The federal
courts made it
quite clear that
a private landowner did not
have standing
to enforce this
reversionary
interest because
the land was
infused with an
important public purpose. The
reversion could
not be automatic
just because the
railroad missed
its construction
deadline. The
country needed
railroads, and
so their interests

St. Joseph & Denver City Railroad Co. v.
Baldwin, 103 U.S. (13 How.) 426 (1880).
If the railroad received a fee simple
absolute from the government, there
was no retained reversionary interest in the federal government and no
interest in the corridor land could
have passed via patent to the adjoining landowners.
But the fee simple absolute was
troublesome when the railroads
were not constructed or when telegraph companies wanted access to
the FGROW lands to place communications facilities that were expressly
made part of the grants. The 1875 act
also provided that railroads could
not prohibit other companies from
using their corridor lands in canyons
or narrow passes. A fee simple absolute is inconsistent with a limitation
that requires the railroad to share its
FGROW with others.
By the turn of the century, as
pressure was building in Congress to forfeit many of the grants
to unbuilt railroads, the Supreme

(1903), and held that a different 186271 FGROW conveyed a "limited fee
made on an implied condition of
reverter." The limited fee interpretation was followed in 1915 for an
1875 act FGROW in Rio Grande West-

ern Railway Co. v. Stringham, 239 U.S.
44 (1915). In Townsend and Stringham,
the Supreme Court recognized what
the lower courts had been holding for
decades, that a FGROW is
a grant made on a condition
subsequent,-that the road shall
be completed by a prescribed
time,-but no one can take
advantage of a breach of this
condition but the government,the grantor,-and in the nature
of things it can only do so by
judicial proceedings authorized
by law, or a legislative resumption of the grant.

took priority over the interests of private settlers.

A Little Railroad Policy
In 1920, Congress passed a comprehensive transportation act to return
the railroads to private ownership
after World War I. The act created
incentives for the railroads to shed
unprofitable lines and consolidate to
become more efficient. The railroads
responded by abandoning thousands
of miles of corridor in the subsequent
decades. Many of these miles were
lands originally granted by the federal government through FGROW,
and their disposition depended on
federal, not state law. The country
was squarely in the situation Congressman Hoar had described. But
Congress had not provided for the
disposition of these regained lands in
its 1920 transportation act, or in any
previous legislation.
Following the Supreme Court's
lead that all FGROWs were either a
fee simple absolute or a limited fee
with an implied condition of reverter,
Congress passed 43 U.S.C. § 912 in
1922 to dispose of any corridor land
that is abandoned and returns to federal control. Section 912 provided
that, on abandonment by the railroad,
the federal interest would pass either
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to a municipality through which the
road runs, to a highway department
that chooses to convert the roadbed
into a public highway within a year
of abandonment, or to the adjacent
landowner. Moreover, the transfer

IF THE RAILROAD
ONLY OBTAINED
AN EASEMENT BYA

FGROW, DID THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
RETAIN THE SERVIENT
FEE, AND WOULD
§ 912 APPLY TO
BOTH SERVIENT FEE
AND REVERSIONARY
INTERESTS OR ONLY
TO REVERSIONARY
INTERESTS FOLLOWING
THE LIMITED FEES?
of the federal interest under § 912
would not occur until abandonment
by the railroad. The act of abandonment was to be determined only by
an act of Congress or a decision of a
court of competent jurisdiction. This
requirement of § 912 continued the
common law practice of requiring
a judicial or congressional determination to exercise the government's
power to terminate a railroad's interest in FGROW grants.
For the next 20 years the federal
courts were in agreement that, in the
case of limited fee FGROWs, § 912
operated after the FGROW had been
declared terminated by an act of Congress or a judicial declaration and the
fee vested back in the United States.
Until 1942, the statutory scheme
worked according to plan. But, in
a case involving a dispute between
the railroad grantee and the government grantor over subsurface mineral
rights in an 1875 act FGROW, the
Supreme Court again changed course
in its interpretation of the property
rights conveyed to the railroads. On a

34
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plea by the government that FGROW
interests were only surface interests,
the Court reversed its 1915 Stringham
decision and interpreted the railroad's interest to be an easement that
would terminate on abandonment
and that did not include the minerals.
That case, Great Northern Railway Co. v.
United States, 315 U.S. 262 (1942), was
based on a long history of state common law cases interpreting railroad
rights-of-way to be easements.
If 1875 act FGROWs were mere
easements, then a whole host of new
issues arose around the disposition of
the land on abandonment. More precisely, if the railroad only obtained an
easement by a FGROW, did the federal government retain the servient
fee, and would § 912 apply to both
servient fee and reversionary interests or only to reversionary interests
following the limited fees? And were
there still some FGROWs held as limited fees with an implied reversionary
interest and others as easements,
even though the terminology of the
grants was the same? And if the
FGROW was an easement and the
government retained the servient fee,
did it convey that servient fee interest to subsequent patentees of the
adjoining land or was the servient fee
considered previously granted lands
unavailable for patenting?

Takings Challenges
to the NTSA
None of this technical legal conundrum really mattered when § 912
gave the federal interest in abandoned FGROW lands to adjacent
landowners. That changed in 1983
when Congress passed an amendment to the National Trails System
Act (NTSA) to promote the preservation of abandoned rail corridors
for future reactivation and to allow
interim recreational trail use in the
meantime. 16 U.S.C. § 1 247(d). The
act provided that all of the railroad's
property rights, whether created
under federal or state law, would
remain intact during the period of
interim trail use if the corridor was
"railbanked" during the abandonment
process. In 1988, further amendments to the NTSA provided that the
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federal government's interests in any
FGROW would be retained for railbanking purposes, and not be subject
to disposal under § 912 to a municipality or to adjacent landowners,
although they could continue to be
embraced in a public highway.
Faced with claims by adjoining
landowners that they were entitled to
unencumbered possession of abandoned FGROW land, numerous courts,
especially the Tenth Circuit courts, held
that regardless of whether the government's retained interest was the
underlying servient fee or a power of
termination, § 912 governed the disposition of that interest. Relying heavily
on the easement as a property right
that terminates automatically, in 2005
the Federal Circuit, in Hash v. United
States, held that if the land office did
not reserve the underlying fee in the
FGROW when it made the land patents
to homesteaders, the government's servient fee interest transferred at the time
of the patent.
Consequently, on railroad abandonment, the government had no
interest in the abandoned corridor
land, and if the corridor is railbanked
and converted to an interim trail, takings liability accrues. Set aside, for
the moment, the absurdity of requiring the government to reserve its
servient fee interests from patents
issued before 1942 when the government first learned it even had servient
fee rather than reversionary interests
in some of its FGROWs.

Brandt Revocable Trust
Affirmed Hash
The lower courts, especially Judge

Baskir in Ellamae Phillips Co. v. United
States, 77 Fed. Cl. 387, 395 (2007), felt
that Hash was wrongly decided and
poorly reasoned, but nonetheless conformed to the mandate that because
the FGROW was an easement and
not a limited fee, the government had
no retained interest in the land and
owed compensation when it authorized preservation of the corridor
for future rail and interim trail use.
The Tenth Circuit, however, had the
most cases involving FGROW and
§ 912 and had developed extensive
precedent that § 912 applied to both

defeasible fee and easement FGROWs
because the railroad easement of Great
Northern had fee-like and easementlike qualities. In United States v. Brandt,
496 Fed. Appx. 822 (10th Cir. 2012), the
Tenth Circuit simply declined to follow
Hash and, instead, held that the government had a sufficient reversionary
interest in an 1875 act FGROW to allow
for preservation of the corridor and
interim trail use.
Despite significant lower court concerns articulated in numerous cases
following the decision in Hash on § 912's
applicability to abandonment, takings
liability when the federal government
continues to exercise dominion over
railbanked FGROW, and the clear congressional understanding of a retained
federal interest in FGROWs, the Supreme
Court affirmed Hash and overturned the
Tenth Circuit's long line of precedents.
Reciting at length the government's
argument in Great Northern that the railroad acquired only an easement and that
easements terminate by abandonment,
leaving the servient fee owner with an
unencumbered possessory estate, eight
Justices agreed that if the government did
not reserve its underlying fee interest, it
passed to patentees.

As in Hash, the Brandt Revocable
Trust Court did not address the longstanding line of cases, including its
own Townsend decision, holding that
FGROW lands were not public lands
available for transfer to patentees. Furthermore, in 1903, the Supreme Court
had held exactly to the contrary in

Townsend that:
At the outset, we premise that, as
the grant of the right of way, the
filing of the map of definite location, and the construction of the
railroad within the quarter section
in question preceded the filing of
the homestead entries on such section, the land forming the right
of way therein was taken out of
the category of public lands subject to pre-emption and sale, and
the Land Department was therefore without authority to convey
rights therein. It follows that the
homesteaders acquired no interest
in the land within the right of way
because of the fact that the grant

to them was of the full legal
subdivisions.
190 U.S. at 269.
The decision in this Townsend case
should have resolved the entire issue

in Hash and Brandt Revocable Trust.
Regardless of whether the FGROW
was an easement or a limited fee,
the homesteader who acquired the
adjoining land acquired no interests
in the FGROW because, once granted
to the railroad, that land was withdrawn from the category of public
lands available for patenting to private landowners. Amazingly, here
was a case involving precisely the
issue being litigated in Hash and

Brandt Revocable Trust, in which the
Supreme Court had explicitly stated
that the homesteaders acquired no
property rights, and Justice Roberts
didn't even cite the case for this point.
Although Townsend dealt with 186271 act FGROWs, no decision before
Hash had ever held that the limited
fee/easement difference mattered in
the question of homesteaders taking an interest in the FGROW or the
applicability of § 912 on the government's retained interest.
Focusing solely on the fact that an
easement terminates on abandonment to unburden the servient fee, the
majority opinion held that the government had no retained interest in 1875
act easement FGROWs. But the fact
that the railroad has an easement tells
us nothing about who owns the servient fee. Citing only to an Indian land
case involving a very different type
of FGROW, and an Attorney General
opinion that predated the right-of-way
act itself, the majority held that the government gave its servient fee interest to
homesteaders, without even acknowledging that there was direct Supreme
Court precedent, holding to the contrary, on the precise issue before the
Court.
The decision is simply wrong.
Apparently, it was more important
to Justice Roberts to rebuff the government for refashioning its 1942
argument in Great Northern than to
actually research the law and ascertain Congress's intent. The takeaway:
results-oriented decision making can

be accomplished easily by simply
ignoring the precedents and the unsupported rationale with which the lower
courts were struggling. What's hundreds of millions of dollars in takings
liability when one can smugly put the
government in its place?
Justice Sotomayor, the lone dissenter, engaged the issue of whether
the government retained a reversionary
interest in 1875 act easement FGROW.
She concluded that the Court's 1942
GreatNorthern decision that an 1875 act
FGROW was an easement says nothing about whether the government
retained its servient fee interest or conveyed that interest to homesteaders in
subsequent patents. She is correct. Noting that railroad easements are hybrid
property rights, with fee-like and easement-like characteristics, and that there
is absolutely no evidence supporting
the view that the government intended
to give away its ultimate control over
these public transportation corridors, she argued that the government
retained a reversionary type interest
in all FGROWs and that § 912, and its
1988 amendments, apply to them all
equally.

Conclusion
Hash and Brandt Revocable Trust are
wrong on the law, wrong on the history, and wrong on the policy. It is
disappointing that only Justice Sotomayor looked into the complex legal
issues deep enough to see some of
the problems and contradictions with
the majority's decision. While the
Department of Justice continues to be
slammed with case after case of adjacent landowners claiming a taking
of their property when their expectations of a windfall are thwarted by
continued use of an adjacent railroad
corridor for trail use, the federal treasury continues to be tapped to replace
that windfall to adjacent landowners
with an added bonus to their lawyers.
As the Court has done so many times
before, it could fix the error it has
perpetuated by overruling Hash and

Brandt Revocable Trust in a subsequent
case. But in the meantime, greed and
politics have once again trampled the
public interest and taken public property for private use. E
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